



# Transitional Justice: TIMOR-LESTE CASE STUDY

AJAR and Transitional Justice Asia Network

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## TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE ASIA NETWORK

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### About Asia Justice and Rights

Asia Justice and Rights (AJAR) is a regional human rights organisation based in Jakarta, Indonesia. AJAR works to increase the capacity of local and national organisations in the fight against entrenched impunity and to contribute to building cultures based on accountability, justice and willingness to learn from the root causes of mass human rights violations in the Asia Pacific region. For more information, visit <http://www.asia-ajar.org>.

### About Transitional Justice Asia Network

Transitional Justice Asia Network facilitates learning and knowledge-building on transitional justice and accountability initiatives across the region.

### Photos

1. A woman survivor shows a tattoo she inscribed on her right arm with the date of her arrest (Photo credit: Anne-Cecile Esteve for AJAR).
2. Women survivors from Marabia, Timor-Leste place their hands on a map of their community. (Photo credit: AJAR).
3. The Chega! National Centre holds a meeting to present its new staff members and future programme, at the building of the former Balide prison (Photo credit: ACbit).

INDUSAUN-KOLÓKIU KONA-BA CENTRO NACIONAL CHEGA! I.P  
APRENDE HUSI MEMÓRIA PASADU HODI HAKAT BA OIN NO ESPERANSA

DILI, ANTIGO COMARCA BALIDE. 20-21 SETEMBRO 2017



Like other parts of the Portuguese empire, East Timor remained under colonial rule into the 1970s. Only when the Carnation Revolution brought democracy to Portugal in April 1975 did decolonisation become possible. However, by August, civil war had broken out between rival political parties. Portuguese authorities took flight. Up to 3000 people were killed and tens of thousands were displaced, with both warring parties committing crimes, including the execution of prisoners.

Indonesian military incursions soon followed. With the support of foreign powers a full-scale invasion occurred on 7 December 1975. The ensuing quarter century of Indonesian occupation was marked by massacres, famine, sexual violence, torture of prisoners and various other forms of political repression. Timorese resistance continued, through both military and clandestine organisations. While atrocities were overwhelmingly committed by Indonesian forces and their local proxies, war crimes including torture and executions were also carried out by resistance forces.

The fall of Soeharto in Indonesia in 1998 eventually enabled a democratic solution. In 1999 the new Indonesian President agreed to a vote on independence or special autonomy. The ballot would be administered by the UN but with Indonesia responsible for security. On 30 August 1999, 78.5% of Timorese voters opted for independence. However the periods leading up to and following the vote were marked by violent attacks against actual and perceived supporters of independence. Up to 1500 people were killed and many more were tortured, including through sexual violence. Homes and infrastructure were destroyed and around half the population was displaced. Most violence was carried out by pro-autonomy militias, although Indonesian forces also participated directly. Truth-seeking bodies would ultimately conclude that the crimes were orchestrated by Indonesian officials.

Indonesia's departure was followed by a period of UN administration and ultimately Timorese independence in 2002. Since then political violence has been drastically reduced, although not

eradicated. An outbreak of conflict in 2006 required the return of international troops and several senior political and security-sector leaders were implicated as possibly bearing responsibility. An incident on 11 February 2008 resulted in the fatal shooting of an ex-military rebel leader and the serious wounding of then President José Ramos-Horta. The creation of a joint police and military operation in response set a precedent which was subsequently used again in 2015 when dissidents were accused of criminal activity by the government.

## Civil society

East Timor's history of organised resistance and close links with the democracy movement in Indonesia ensured an initially strong civil society, albeit one accustomed to confronting a militarised authoritarian regime. However, the independence process has since seen it depleted as successive waves of human capital moved to the UN, state institutions and political parties. Despite this, in the early years of UN administration and independence civil society was active in seeking accountability for past wrongs. More recently as those issues have been sidelined in public discourse, civil society has struggled to keep them on the public agenda. This challenge has only been heightened by an increasing atmosphere of intimidation against critics of the government, as well as the huge range of issues which require civil society attention in the context of state-building as well as new income streams which have enabled corruption. A strong core of human rights activists continue to advocate for justice and to constructively work with state institutions behind the scenes.

## Situation of victims

The enormous scale of crimes committed in East Timor over a protracted period and against a small population has meant that few, if any, families remain untouched. This has enabled many, including members of the Timorese leadership, to claim that "we are all victims." While

there are elements of truth in this assertion it also masks the many differences within the victim populations. A number of these have formed bases for subsequent differential treatment or experiences. Some categories of victims having received recognition or assistance from the state while others have not; likewise, some strongly self-identify as victims while others (including many now holding positions of leadership) do not. Valorisation initiatives have in some case become objects of competition between veterans and victims. Even the term “victim” has become contested, with government now preferring to refer to “survivors”. Challenges such as these have presented obstacles to victim self-organisation and advocacy. However in recent years a network of victims has become more active with support from key civil society organisations.

## Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Processes to date

### *Specific international and state mechanisms*

#### Truth seeking

The conflicts in Timor-Leste have been the subject of a series of truth-seeking initiatives.

In the immediate aftermath of the 1999 violence international reports were rapidly produced. These included reports from three UN Special Rapporteurs; a UN International Commission of Inquiry; and “KPP-HAM”, a special commission established by Indonesia’s national human rights institution, all of which were published by January 2000. A further report, written by historian Geoffrey Robinson for the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, was completed in July 2003.<sup>1</sup>

However these reports were all limited in scope to the events of 1999, and were

<sup>1</sup> Although not made publicly accessible until it was released as part of the CAVR’s final report in 2005.

undertaken rapidly. There remained a need to consider the broader conflict, and through a process with local ownership. In 2000 civil society and the CNRT supported proposals for the creation of a national reconciliation commission. In 2001 the UN Transitional Administration (UNTAET) established the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (usually known by its Portuguese abbreviation “CAVR”).

The CAVR was mandated to establish the truth regarding human rights violations committed during the entire period from 25 April 1974 to 25 October 1999. It collected 7824 statements, across all parts of Timor-Leste. It also received submissions, conducted research, held public hearings, convened community based reconciliation proceedings concerning “minor” crimes, and implemented programs for victim support and the reception of returning refugees. The CAVR’s final report, “Chega!” was submitted to the President on 31 October 2005. It ran to more than 2500 pages and included 204 recommendations. In December 2005, the President dissolved the CAVR and established the Post-CAVR Technical Secretariat (“STP-CAVR”) which had a limited mandate, to publish and distribute copies of “Chega!”, and maintain the CAVR’s archive and premises.

However even before the completion of the CAVR’s work, there were signs that support for it was waning among the Timorese political leadership. In December 2004 Indonesia and Timor-Leste agreed to establish a further, bilateral, truth commission. Terms of reference for the Commission for Truth and Friendship (“CTF”) were agreed in March 2005. They were limited in scope to the events of part of 1999 and included recommending amnesties and measures for the benefit of the “wrongly accused”. It was expressly stated that the process would not “lead to prosecution”. The CTF was attacked as politicised by civil society, criticism which intensified when it held a series of public hearings at which high profile persons denied responsibility for human rights violations. Ultimately however the CTF’s final report, submitted in July 2008 (and made public the

following month) made no recommendations for amnesty, and its findings largely mirrored those of previous mechanisms, including by concluding that the Indonesian military bore responsibility.

Simultaneously, while the CTF was undertaking its work, the 2006 crisis had occurred. To establish the truth in respect of those events the then Foreign Minister requested the UN to establish an Independent Special Commission of Inquiry (“CoI”). It reported in October 2006, identifying institutional failings which had led to the violence but also naming numerous individuals whom it recommended be prosecuted or further investigated. It recommended reparations for victims.

### Criminal prosecutions

In response to the reports released in the months immediately following the end of the conflict, mechanisms criminal prosecutions were established in both Indonesia and Timor-Leste.

In Indonesia an Ad Hoc Human Rights Court was established with partial jurisdiction over the events of 1999. Investigations by the Attorney-General’s office led to the indictments of 18 persons. In trials carried out during 2002 and 2003 six defendants were found guilty. However all convictions were later overturned on appeal. The process has been widely criticised as marked by fundamental failings, and in particular by a lack of will in the clearly politicised Attorney General’s office which not only led inadequate investigations but also failed to make use of relevant evidence at trial.

A parallel prosecutions process was established in Timor-Leste. There UNTAET established Special Panels for Serious Crimes within the Dili District Court, having jurisdiction to try persons accused of serious crimes, including crimes against humanity and war crimes. A specialist unit, the Serious Crimes Unit (“SCU”) was established in the Timorese prosecution service. By mid-2005 indictments had been issued against 391 individuals. In the trials which had by then proceeded 84 accused persons were

convicted, and only 3 acquitted. The remaining indictees remained at large in Indonesia, which failed to cooperate in their apprehension.

In addition to the problem of being unable to compel the production of indictees, the Timorese serious crimes proceedings have been subject to numerous criticisms. Investigations focused only on events from 1999 and serious weaknesses afflicted practically all aspects of the process: prosecution strategy, defence representation, judicial reasoning, and court services (including translation and witness support). Moreover, Timorese leaders increasingly distanced themselves from the proceedings. In 2003 an indictment was issued for former Indonesian Defence Minister and military commander Wiranto and several other senior Indonesian officials. Each of the UN and Timorese prosecution service distanced itself from indictment and identified the other as having responsibility for it. Soon thereafter the Timorese President embraced Wiranto for the cameras, a gesture which was widely interpreted as a signal that the Timorese leadership did not support these prosecutions.

When the UN downscaled its presence in East Timor in May 2005 funding for the SCU was cut and its work effectively ended. A large number of investigations remained incomplete. Soon thereafter, in June 2005, a UN Commission of Experts reported on the progress of serious crimes prosecutions in Timor-Leste. It recommended that prosecutions with an international component continue in Timor-Leste and Indonesia and if this did not occur that an international criminal mechanism be established.

More than 12 years later these recommendations remain unimplemented. For a period between 2006 and 2012 the UN mission in Timor-Leste incorporated a “Serious Crimes Investigation Team”, which worked on completing serious crimes investigations and providing draft indictments to the Timorese Prosecutor-General’s office. However no systematic efforts have been taken to progress that work further by issuing indictments. No mechanism for

extradition from Indonesia has been created.

Such prosecutions have in any event been relatively rare since the 2005 closure of the SCU, occurring only when an indictee was discovered to have returned from Indonesia to Timor-Leste. In 2009 the lack of political support for such proceedings was made clear when the Timorese government intervened to bring about the release and return to Indonesia of indicted former militia commander Maturus Bere. Since then occasional prosecutions have continued, albeit of lower-level indictees. Between 2010 and 2014 five separate serious crimes trials were held, involving 14 defendants.

However in October 2014 a further impediment to serious crimes trials arose when the Timorese Parliament summarily fired almost all foreign judicial actors, including judges. Although agreement was eventually reached with Portugal in 2017 for international judicial assistance to be re-established, judges have not returned to line functions but only to judicial inspection functions. Capacity therefore continues to be lacking for compliance with Timorese criminal procedure law, which continues to require that serious crimes trials be held before panels which include two international judges.

### Reparations

Various reparative measures have been recommended by the bodies established to respond to the conflicts in Timor-Leste, most prominent among them the recommendations of the CAVR and CTF. While recognising victims' right to reparations, the CAVR also acknowledged the challenges involved in establishing a comprehensive reparations scheme, particularly given resource shortages and the overwhelming size of the victim population. It proposed a scheme which prioritised reparations for those victims with the greatest levels of continuing vulnerability. The CTF's recommendations for reparations were less comprehensive, but included the establishment a centre to conduct ongoing work, including on documentation and therapeutic programs for victims, as well as a commission for disappeared persons.

Despite these recommendations, to date no overarching reparations program has been established for any of the victims of the conflicts between 1975 and 1999. It is, however, noteworthy that a number of programs have been established for the benefit of other groups. In particular programs have been established to support and recognise veterans of the resistance. Compensation was also provided to certain groups affected by the 2006 crisis.

In 2009 a group of civil society organisations and victims' representatives produced draft laws for reparations and a "Memory Institute", the latter including a mandate to search for disappeared persons. The laws were presented to the Parliament but their consideration was repeatedly postponed, apparently in part because of objections by veterans to the establishment of programs for victims, and they eventually lapsed following the end of the parliamentary term in 2012.

Since then, calls for reparations schemes have largely dropped out of public discourse. Efforts led by civil society and victims' groups have continued however, and these are discussed further below.

### Security sector reform

In contrast to other post-conflict context, formal "transitional justice" in Timor-Leste has not included a focus on security sector initiatives. National military and police institutions were established along democratic principles and it was apparently assumed that such institutions were free of past abusers on the basis that pro-autonomy militias and Indonesian soldiers alike had left for Indonesia. Despite the CAVR's eventual findings regarding crimes committed during the civil war and within the resistance, no systematic program was established for screening security institutions for the persons responsible for those crimes.

After the 2006 crisis erupted, revealing problems in both police and military institutions a greater focus fell on the security sector for the first time. Despite this, efforts to vet and reform those institutions have remained limited. Some vetting was undertaken after 2006 within

the police, with a focus on removing persons who had been involved in the crisis. Ministers responsible for both institutions resigned, but other senior figures including some implicated by the Col have continued to play central roles in the leadership (they include the current Prime Minister, Mari Alkatiri; the current head of the military, Lere Anan; and the last President, Taur Matan Ruak). Almost none of the investigations and prosecutions recommended by the Col occurred. The use of “joint command” operations in 2008 and 2015, and the failure to respond to allegations of abuse by their members, reveal an inclination to unduly involve military in internal security matters and to allow them to operate above the law, two characteristics which point towards the failure to effectively replace a security sector culture inherited from Indonesia.

### *Ongoing efforts: State-building, civil society initiatives and recent developments*

In recent years public discussion of past atrocities has waned and few efforts have been expressly directed at addressing them. However ongoing attention continues to be given to broader questions state-building, and much of this work could be viewed as forms of transitional justice insofar as it is directed at the development of democratic institutions and the prevention of future abuse. This includes for example, the strengthening of the judiciary and oversight mechanisms such as the Provedore for Human Rights and Justice and the Anti-Corruption Commission, and efforts directed at ensuring democratic control and accountability in the security sector. Despite attentions on these areas, significant work remains to be done in ensuring Timor-Leste’s status as a state governed by the rule of law and human rights principles.

Meanwhile, key civil society actors continue to support victims and initiate measures addressed to past crimes. Some have established programs focused on facilitating victims’ access to existing government programs of a general nature and have had particular success in doing

so with health services and welfare benefits provided by the Ministry of Social Solidarity. Efforts have been made to focus particularly on more vulnerable categories of victim, including women. Other groups within civil society have focused on other responses to the past conflict, including specific efforts at memorialisation and at recovering of the victims’ remains. A collaboration among civil society in Timor-Leste and Indonesia is also working on reuniting families who were separated when Timorese children were taken to Indonesia during the conflict. Civil society also provides support to a formal national network of victims.

In 2015 the then Prime Minister announced plans for a working group to audit progress on implementing the CAVR’s recommendations and consider appropriate follow up. The working group was established in May 2016 and reported in November 2016. It found that the majority of the CAVR’s recommendations had not been fully implemented, and recommended the establishment of an independent follow-up institution. In December 2016 the “Centro Nacional Chega!” (“CNC”) was established as an independent public institute. Its mandate encompasses memorialisation (including research and documentation); promoting education based on Timor’s history; external relations including dissemination of the CAVR report both inside and outside Timor-Leste; and promoting “survivor solidarity”, a term which appears to be meant as signifying support for victims. The CNC was officially opened in July 2017.

## Conclusions, challenges and lessons learned

Timor’s ongoing transitional justice process reveals contrasting results. An abundance of truth-seeking mechanisms have left a clear and highly credible record about what happened during various parts of the country’s past, and who was responsible (although the February 2008 incident remains a noticeable exception). However, poor follow-up and dissemination have limited

the impact that these mechanisms have had. Their reports are often cited to support well-known aspects of their findings, but not well-used as research resources or to educate on lesser-known parts of Timorese history.

Moreover, a lack of political will has stifled the implementation of the recommendations made by these mechanisms. The most often cited reason for this is the realpolitik imperative to maintain positive relations with Indonesia. This clearly plays an important role. However internal dynamics have been equally potent. These include the tendency for veterans to claim ownership of the past conflict, and the increased risk of prosecution which a culture of accountability would pose to members of Timor's national leadership in the wake of the 2006 crisis.

Despite this, progress has been made in recent years. Key civil society groups have adapted their approaches to these challenges. They have increasingly taken what measure they can independent of state institutions to support victims, memorialise and educate. They have also found subtle ways to work with government behind the scenes on institutional reform efforts which can be viewed as state-building while also addressing transitional justice imperatives. Persistent efforts, diplomatic framing of the issues and a low-profiled approach by long-term civil society actors have finally succeeded in establishing a credible independent transitional justice follow-up institution in the CNC.

However these successes almost all relate to efforts which are forward-looking and reparative. The measures which are most starkly missing are those directed towards accountability. Only limited prosecutions have occurred, and these largely focused on low-level accused persons, and without robust procedures to ensure fair trials. Senior figures involved in violence and human rights violations have almost universally avoided not only prosecution, but also disciplinary measures or other sanctions, and in most cases even public condemnation. Unfortunately this remains true not only for members of the Indonesian military and political leadership, but also for those in Timor-Leste's elite who have been implicated in crimes carried out during the civil war, the resistance era, or in 2006.

The transitional justice experience in Timor-Leste demonstrates that opportunities and challenges will change over time. An early enthusiasm for accountability and reform may not endure, and every effort must be taken to benefit from it while it exists. As attitudes change there is a need to adapt methods and the discourse used to frame reforms. Even in the absence of state support for justice mechanisms expressly so identified, there may be much that civil society can achieve either on its own, or by focusing on the state-building aspects of the measures sought. Nonetheless, it may be many years before avenues for true accountability are available.



## Transitional Justice Timeline in Timor-Leste

DATE	EVENT
<b>25 April 1974</b>	The “Carnation Revolution” in Portugal brings about the fall of the Salazar-Caetano regime, triggering the beginning of decolonisation.
<b>August 1975</b>	Civil war breaks out in East Timor between Fretilin and UDT.
<b>28 November 1975</b>	Fretilin declares independence from Portugal.
<b>7 December 1975</b>	Indonesian openly launches a full-scale invasion of East Timor.
<b>12 November 1991</b>	Indonesian troops massacre mourners, students, and other protesters at Santa Cruz Cemetery. Video footage of the massacre smuggled out of East Timor raises the international profile of Indonesian human rights violations.
<b>May 1998</b>	Following protests and violence, Indonesian President Suharto resigns and is replaced by Vice President, B. J. Habibie.
<b>27 January 1999</b>	Indonesian President Habibie proposes that the future of East Timor be determined by vote with a choice between special autonomy and independence.
<b>April 1999</b>	There is a spike in outbreaks of violence by pro-autonomy militia groups against (perceived or real) supporters of independence.
<b>5 May 1999</b>	Agreements reached among the UN, Indonesia, and Portugal provide for the holding of a popular consultation to be administered by a UN mission, but with security provided by Indonesia.
<b>30 August 1999</b>	The popular consultation is held, with a result of 78% of voters opting for independence.
<b>September 1999</b>	Militia groups and Indonesian forces engage in widespread violence that includes massive destruction of property and displacement of a large percentage of the population.
<b>15 September 1999</b>	The UN Security Council passes Resolution 1264 that authorises the deployment of INTERFET (International Force for East Timor, a non-UN peacekeeping taskforce).
<b>20 September 1999</b>	INTERFET begins its deployment to East Timor.
<b>22 September 1999</b>	Indonesia’s National Human Rights Commission establishes the Commission of Inquiry for Human Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM).
<b>24-27 September 1999</b>	The UN Human Rights Commission holds a special session on East Timor. It concludes with a resolution that calls on the Secretary-General to establish an international commission of inquiry, and requests UN special rapporteurs to visit East Timor and report on the situation. The resolution is later endorsed by the UN’s Economic and Social Council.
<b>15 October 1999</b>	In compliance with the UN Human Rights Commission and Economic and Social Council resolutions, the UN International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor is established.
<b>19 October 1999</b>	The Indonesian People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) passes Resolution V of 1999 on the Result of the Referendum in East Timor.
<b>25 October 1999</b>	The UN Security Council passes Resolution 1272, establishing UNTAET (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor).
<b>4-10 November 1999</b>	The UN Special Rapporteurs on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions; Torture; and Violence Against Women undertake a mission to East Timor.

<b>10 December 1999</b>	UN Special Rapporteurs' reports on the human rights situation in East Timor are transmitted to the UN General Assembly and published.
<b>31 January 2000</b>	The report of the UN International Commission of Inquiry is submitted to the UN General Assembly and published.
<b>31 January 2000</b>	Indonesia's KPP-HAM completes its inquiry on East Timor and presents its report to the Indonesian Attorney-General, including recommendations for investigations and prosecutions.
<b>March - June 2000</b>	UNTAET regulations establish a court system in East Timor, including Special Panels for Serious Crimes within the Dili District Court, and a prosecution service that includes an office responsible for prosecuting serious crimes. "Serious crimes" are defined as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offences, and torture.
<b>June 2000</b>	UNTAET supports a workshop for civil society, church, and community leaders to discuss transitional justice. It recommends that the CNRT Congress (National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction) consider a proposal for an independent truth and reconciliation commission.
<b>21 to 30 August 2000</b>	CNRT Congress recommends the establishment of a commission for resettlement and national reconciliation. A steering committee is established including human rights groups, the church, political parties and others, and supported by UNTAET that holds public consultations.
<b>13 July 2001</b>	UNTAET formally establishes the CAVR (Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation).
<b>March 2002-03</b>	Eighteen people are tried by the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Indonesia for crimes committed in East Timor in 1999. Six of them are convicted, but all are eventually acquitted on appeal.
<b>24 February 2003</b>	The Serious Crimes Unit files an indictment with the Special Panels for Serious Crimes against the most senior members of Indonesia's military during the 1999 violence, including Defence Minister and TNI (Indonesian Army) Commander Wiranto.
<b>10 May 2004</b>	The Special Panels for Serious Crimes issues a warrant for the arrest of Wiranto.
<b>14 December 2004</b>	Indonesia and East Timor issue a joint declaration that reflects their agreement to establish the bilateral CTF (Commission for Truth and Friendship).
<b>18 February 2005</b>	A Commission of Experts is appointed by the UN Secretary-General to assess mechanisms needed to establish accountability for crimes committed in 1999.
<b>9 March 2005</b>	Indonesia and East Timor agrees on the Terms of Reference for the CTF.
<b>20 May 2005</b>	UNMISSET (UN Mission for Support in East Timor) completes its mandate and is replaced with UNAMET (UN Mission in East Timor). With the closure of UNMISSET, the Serious Crimes Unit within the Timorese Prosecutor-General's Office ceases to exist.
<b>15 July 2005</b>	The report of the UN Commission of Experts, appointed to review the prosecution of serious crimes, is submitted to the UN General Assembly and published. The Commission recommends continued prosecutions in East Timor and Indonesia or, in the event that this does not occur, the establishment of an international criminal tribunal by the Security Council. East Timor's Prime Minister and President write to the UN rejecting the Commission's conclusions.
<b>31 October 2005</b>	The CAVR presents its final report, <i>Chega!</i> , to East Timor's then President Xanana Gusmão.

<b>20 December 2005</b>	The CAVR is dissolved and the STP-CAVR (Post-CAVR Technical Secretariat) is established by President Gusmão to succeed it.
<b>April – May 2006</b>	Political violence breaks out in East Timor including between police and military institutions. Security is eventually restored with the assistance of an Australian-led international military force.
<b>12 June 2006</b>	Following a request from José Ramos Horta (then Minister of Foreign Affairs), the UN Secretary-General requests the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish an independent special commission of inquiry to look into the events of April and May 2006.
<b>25 August 2006</b>	The UN Security Council establishes UNMIT (UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste), including the Serious Crimes Investigation Team, that is tasked with completing investigations into serious crimes committed in 1999.
<b>2 October 2006</b>	The UN Independent Special Commission of Inquiry reports on the events of April and May 2006. It recommends investigations and prosecutions of those identified as responsible in processes to be led by international lawyers and judges, as well as reparations for the victims of the violence.
<b>7 March 2007</b>	Former Interior Minister, Rogerio Lobato, is convicted in relation to the illegal distribution of weapons in the 2006 crisis and sentenced to seven and a half years in custody. Within a year he is released to seek medical treatment overseas and is later granted early release ( <i>indultu</i> ) by the President. No other senior political figures are tried in connection with the crisis.
<b>11 February 2008</b>	President Ramos Horta is shot in what is said to be an attack by former soldiers rebelling against the President and Prime Minister. In response, a state of siege is declared and a joint military and police operation established (resulting in a number of reported human rights violations). Despite a Parliamentary resolution calling for the establishment of an independent international investigation body, none is established and speculation continues as to the truth about the day's events.
<b>13 March 2008</b>	The Indonesian Supreme Court acquits former militia leader Eurico Guterres on appeal with the consequence that all 18 persons tried by the Ad Hoc Human rights Court for East Timor are ultimately acquitted.
<b>15 July 2008</b>	The CTF submits its final report to the Presidents of East Timor and Indonesia.
<b>8 August 2009</b>	The former militia leader Maternus Bere, who was indicted on charges of crimes against humanity including in relation to the Suai church massacre, is arrested and detained following his return to East Timor from Indonesia.
<b>30 August 2009</b>	Timorese leaders permit Maternus Bere to be released from detention and given sanctuary in the Indonesian Embassy. Resulting protests culminate in an unsuccessful vote of no-confidence in the Parliament (against the government of Prime Minister Gusmão) on 12 October 2009.
<b>29 October 2009</b>	Maternus Bere is permitted to leave East Timor for Indonesia where he remains without prosecution.
<b>July 2010</b>	Committee A of the Parliament holds public consultations on two proposed laws (initiated by civil society and victims) for reparations and the establishment of an institution to oversee the recommendations of the CAVR and CTF. Further postponements occur in 2011 and 2012.
<b>September 2010</b>	The two laws on reparations and a post-CAVR and CTF institution are approved in general by the Parliament, but further debate is postponed pending the resolution of questions concerning benefits for veterans. Ultimately the laws are never adopted by the Parliament.
<b>December 2012</b>	The Serious Crimes Investigation Team ends its work, transferring all proposed indictments and incomplete serious crimes investigations to the Prosecutor-General's office.

<b>24 October 2014</b>	By a Parliamentary resolution instigated by the government, foreigners working as judges, prosecutors, and lawyers in the Timorese judicial institutions are dismissed. Their visas are revoked by government resolution on 26 October.
<b>May 2015</b>	AJAR and civil society groups, working with Indonesia's Human Rights Commission and the Provedor for Justice and Human Rights (PDHJ) of Timor-Leste facilitate a reunion of 14 "stolen children" living in Indonesia with their families in Timor-Leste. Prime Minister Rui de Araujo asks to meet with the survivors.
<b>November 2015</b>	AJAR, STP-CAVR, and ACbit (Association of <i>Chega!</i> for Women) initiate a 10-year commemoration of the CAVR report that includes an evaluation regarding implementation of the recommendations. The Prime Minister attends a session and makes a commitment to create a follow-on institution.
<b>30 December 2015</b>	Control of STP-CAVR is formally transferred from the Presidency to the Prime Minister's office.
<b>May and November 2016</b>	More stolen children reunion visits are held in May and November. Survivors meet with the President and Prime Minister.
<b>27 May 2016</b>	The Prime Minister's Working Group on a CAVR follow-up institution is established and carries out its work from May to November 2016.
<b>July 2016</b>	Indonesian President Jokowi appoints Wiranto as Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs.
<b>30 November 2016</b>	The Prime Minister's working group completes its work, reporting that most of the CAVR's recommendations remain entirely or partially unimplemented and recommends the establishment of an independent public institution to be responsible for follow-up.
<b>14 December 2016</b>	The CNC ( <i>Chega!</i> National Centre) is established with a mandate that includes memorialisation, education, external relations, dissemination of the CAVR report, and survivor solidarity.
<b>17 July 2017</b>	The CNC is formally opened in the former CAVR headquarters at the Balide Prison.

